Amir Ronen

Post Doctoral research fellow at Stanford and UC Berkeley.
In October 2002 I will join the Industrial Engineering and Management faculty at the Technion.
My web page will probably move to: http://ie.technion.ac.il/amirr.phtml
My Email will be amirr@ie.technion.ac.il

Contact Information

Phone: +1-650-7258814

Email: amirr@robotics.stanford.edu

Office: Gates Building, Room 133, Stanford.

Research Interests

The interplay between game theory and computer science, theoretical computer science, game theory, mathematical economics, electronic commerce and the Internet. I am also interested in information retrieval theory and practice, machine learning, multi agent systems and distributed algorithms.

Research Papers

Optimal Auctions are Hard (extended abstract) Optimal Auctions are Hard. Submitted (2002). By A. Ronen, and A. Saberi. PDF version

Fault Tolerant Mechanism Design. Submitted (2002). By Ryan Proter, A. Ronen, Y. Shoham and M. Tennenholtz. To appear in UAI 2002

On approximating optimal auctions. In proceedings of the Third ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC01). By A. Ronen. PDF version.

Mechanism design with incomplete languages. In proceedings of the Third ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC01). By A. Ronen. PDF version.

A draft of my PHD thesis. By A. Ronen.

Algorithms For Rational Agents. Invited for SOFSEM2000. By A. Ronen.

Computationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms. In proceedings of the Second ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC00). By N. Nisan and A. Ronen. PDF version.

Algorithmic Mechanism Design (full version). Games and Economic Behavior 35 (2001): 166-196. Extended abstract appeared at the Thirty-First Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC99). By N. Nisan and A. Ronen. PDF version.

A competitive algorithm for managing sharing in the distributed execution of functional programs. Journal of Functional Programming , 7(4):421-440, July 1997. By G. Aharoni, A. Barak and A. Ronen.

Vita Etc.

Family Photos