Team-maxmin equilibria (1997)by B. von Stengel and D. Koller
Abstract:
In a noncooperative game, a team is a set of players that have identical payoffs. We investigate zero-sum games where a team of several players plays against a single adversary. The team is not regarded as a single player because the team members might not be able to coordinate their actions. In such a game, a certain equilibrium can be selected naturally: the minmax equilibrium. It assures the team players the best payoff they can hope for, given their inability to coordinate. A minmax equilibrium exists, and in a generic game it is unique.
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B. von Stengel and D. Koller (1997). "Team-maxmin equilibria." Games and Economic Behavior, 21, 309-321.
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Bibtex citation
@article{vonStengel+Koller:GEB97,
author = {B. {von Stengel} and D. Koller},
title = {Team-maxmin equilibria},
journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
volume = {21},
month = {December},
year = 1997,
pages = {309--321},
}
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